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security: OWASP audit and hardening (v1.0.8)
- Archive XSS: wrap get_the_archive_title/description with wp_kses_post() in ContextBuilder to sanitize Editor-editable term content rendered via |raw - Comment fields: esc_html() on comment_author, esc_url() on comment_author_url at data source; template updated to output pre-escaped URL via |raw - dark-mode.js: whitelist localStorage value against ['dark','light'] to prevent attribute injection from third-party script tampering - TwigService: add is_safe=>html to esc_html/esc_attr/esc_url Twig functions to prevent double-encoding if autoescape is ever enabled - Add .markdownlint.json (disable MD024 duplicate headings, MD013 line length) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@
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*/
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function getPreferredTheme() {
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var stored = localStorage.getItem(STORAGE_KEY);
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if (stored) {
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// Whitelist: only honour known-good values to prevent attribute injection
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// from a tampered localStorage (e.g. XSS-written value by another script).
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if (stored === 'dark' || stored === 'light') {
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return stored;
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}
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return window.matchMedia('(prefers-color-scheme: dark)').matches ? 'dark' : 'light';
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